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ABSTRACT      Towards  the  end  of  her  eventful  and  productive  life,  Val  Plumwood  was  turning  toward 
Indigenous people and cultures as a way of encountering the lived experience of ideas she was working with 
theoretically. At the same time, she was defining herself as a philosophical animist. As I understand her term, 
she was making connections with animism as a worldview, but rather than mimic or appropriate indigenous 
animisms  she  was  developing  a  foundation  that  could  be  argued  from  within  western  philosophy.  Her 
beautiful definition of philosophical animism is that it “opens the door to a world in which we can begin to 
negotiate  life  membership  of  an  ecological  community  of  kindred  beings.”  Thus,  her  animism,  like 
indigenous animisms, was not a doctrine or orthodoxy, but rather a path, a way of life, a mode of encounter. 
In the spirit of open-ended encounter, I aim to bring her work into dialogue with some of my Australian 
Aboriginal  teachers.  More  specifically,  I  focus  on  developing  an  enlarged  account  of  active  listening, 
considering it as the work participants engage in as they inter-act with other sentient creatures. I take a 
country or place based perspective, engaging with life on the inside of the webs and patterns of connection. 
 
An earlier version of this paper was presented as the Val Plumwood Memorial Lecture at the Minding Animals 
Conference, held in Newcastle, Australia in July 2009. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
I treasured Val Plumwood’s life and thought, and during the years when we worked together at 
the Australian National University in the Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies (now 
part of the Fenner School), we became good colleagues as well as friends. Our commitment 
was to nurture the environmental humanities as an emerging interdisciplinary field that works 
across the great binaries of western thought, rethreading the fabric of knowledge across arts 
and sciences, and across dominant and excluded knowledges. One of the chief aims was to 
stimulate and sustain the great humanities’ project of imagining and working out “new ways to 
live with the earth.”
1  
Val died in 2008, and we gave her a green burial at home on her beloved Plumwood 
Mountain. As we stood around the open cardboard coffin a large butterfly flew amongst us and 
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settled on Val’s body. It stayed there long enough for us to feel that the moment was truly 
significant.  Then  it  took  wing  and  disappeared  into  the  forest.  We  were  awed  by  the 
connection  between  Val,  the  butterfly  and  the  forest,  and  many  of  us  felt  re-inspired  to 
continue  her  work  in  the  world.  This  awesome  moment  was  expressive  of  much  of  Val’s 
philosophy. We saw before us the intentionality of other creatures—always mysterious, but 
never mindless—and we experienced ourselves as creatures who are attentive to others and 
who are participants in the life of the world.  
I begin with a brief account of Val Plumwood’s life and thought. My main focus is the 
philosophical animism she was working with at the time of her death. Many of the ideas that 
go into her animism had been implicit in her earlier work, but unfortunately no article or essay 
specifically addresses philosophical animism. I cannot write what she would have written; I 
seek, therefore, to open a wider dialogue by engaging with her ideas from the perspective of 
my  encounters  with  Indigenous  animism.  Specifically,  I  will  take  up  themes  of  attentive 
presence,  knowledge  and  gratitude,  and  will  explore  them  in  the  context  of  Indigenous 
animism.  
 
A Life of Action 
Philosopher,  ecofeminist,  and  activist,  Val  Plumwood  was  passionately  committed  to  the 
understanding that the living world is powerful and possesses its own agency and sentience. 
She  was  one  of  the  great  intellects  of  the  late  20
th c e n t u r y ,  a n  e m i n e n t  A u s t r a l i a n  
environmental philosopher and ecofeminist. Her book Feminism and the Mastery of Nature 
(1993) has become a classic.
2 The more recent Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of 
Reason (2002) is becoming a classic too.
3 She is included in the Routledge publication Fifty 
Key Thinkers on the Environment, along with Gandhi, Buddha, and others.
4  
In the 1970s Val and her husband Richard Sylvan (then known as Val and Richard 
Routley) were key figures in a radical critique of traditional western anthropocentric attitudes 
and  actions.  According  to  the  Routleys,  these  attitudes  were  the  expression  of  human 
chauvinism, the belief that only human beings mattered, morally speaking; to the extent that 
anything else mattered it was only because it was useful for us. Together the Routleys asked the 
question in a paper published in 1973 that became a call for action that continues today: “Is 
there a need for a new, an environmental ethic?”
5 
One  of  Val’s  key  concepts  was  ‘hyperseparation’—the  structure  of  dominance  that 
drives western binaries, including nature/culture, female/male, matter/mind, savage/civilised. 
The hyperseparation structure accords value to one side of the binary, and relegates the other 
side  to  a  position  of  oppositional  subordination.  As  is  well  known,  for  example,  her  work 
showed how nature was backgrounded vis-a-vis the human, and thus relegated to a role that 
allowed usefulness without requiring moral considerability. Along with other ecofeminists
6 her 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London & New York: Routledge, 1993). 
3 Val Plumwood, Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason (London: Routledge, 2002). 
4 Joy Palmer, 50 Key Thinkers on the Environment (London: Routledge, 2001). 
5 Richard Routley, “Is there a Need for New, an Environmental, Ethic?” Sophia 1 (1973). 
6 See for example, Chaone Mallory, “Val Plumwood and Ecofeminist Political Solidarity: Standing With 
The Natural Other,” Ethics and the Environment 14, no. 2 (2009): 3-21; Freya Mathews, Reinhabiting Rose, Val Plumwood’s Philosophical Animism /  
!
95 
work was pivotal in showing that the same structure also maps onto and subtends gender, class, 
colonisation, and other social relations. According to the philosopher Freya Mathews, Val’s 
analysis was not the first to address these dualisms, but:   
 
it was the most comprehensive within the environmental literature. She showed brilliantly 
how this dualistic system of thought created value hierarchies that systematically rendered 
inferior all the terms that came to be associated with nature rather than reason: women, the 
working class, the colonized, the indigenous, as well as the other-than-human world. She 
thereby  demonstrated  that  the  ideology  underpinning  the  domination  of  nature  in  the 
contemporary  West  is  simultaneously  an  ideology  legitimating  and  naturalizing  the 
domination of many subjugated social groups. The implication was that environmentalism 
and struggles for social justice cannot be separated out from one another.
7 
 
Along with her vigorous academic writing, Val was an activist right to the end. The first 
book she and Richard wrote was The Fight for the Forest (1973)—the book that launched the 
struggle  to  protect  Australia’s  old  growth  forests.
8 At  the  same  time,  she  was  living  her 
philosophy. On a mountain near Braidwood in New South Wales, in a wilderness area known 
as  the  Budawangs,  she  and  Richard  built  a  house  using  local  stones.  Val  became  Val 
Plumwood, while Richard took the surname Sylvan. When they divorced, Val stayed on at 
Plumwood Mountain, caretaking and defending the patch of earth she loved so much.  
In the last article she wrote before she died, “Nature in the Active Voice,” Val argued 
that the most challenging task facing the world today is to engage in “a thorough and open 
rethink which has the courage to question our most basic cultural narratives.”
9 Consistent with 
her life’s work, one of the basic narratives she was committed to challenging was the narrative 
of mind/matter dualism which allocates all mind to humans, and leaves all the rest of the living 
and non-living world in a state of mindless matter. Against this dualism, she was arguing for an 
enriched materialism in which matter and mind are mutually informing.     
 
Philosophical Animism 
Val had been gaining interest in Indigenous philosophical ecology as the years went on. At the 
same  time,  my  anthropological  research  was  becoming  ever  more  eco-philosophical.  Our 
converging interests drew us closer together. Val understood that Aboriginal Australians always 
live within a world that is buzzing with multitudes of sentient beings, only a very few of whom 
are human. She thought that a good way to start up a major cultural rethink would be to talk 
with people who are now living within the kinds of understandings we are seeking. She was 
not planning on appropriating anything: her commitment to cultural change was inextricably 
linked to her commitment to social justice. Working in a mode of  inclusion, she explored the 
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significance of Indigenous knowledge today and the kinds of adaptations we would all need to 
make  to  engage  ethically  with  contemporary  globalised  earth  systems,  including  climate 
change, migration and exchange.
10 
Philosophical animism was Val’s term for a stance that would take western peoples into 
the critical rethink she was calling for. Her understanding of animism was consistent with the 
basic proposition, articulated succinctly by Graham Harvey: animism rests on the recognition 
“that the world is full of persons, only some of whom are human, and that life is always lived 
in relationship with others.”
11 The two key points—recognition of personhood beyond humans, 
and centrality of relationships—are integral both to Indigenous animism and to the kind of 
rethink Val was calling for. Indeed, the recent reclaiming and positive reframing of the term 
animism by anthropologists and others is itself a rethink of the sort Val was advocating.  
The term animism has its origins in 19
th century anthropological work that sought to 
demonstrate an evolutionary hierarchy within the human family such that primitives could be 
defined in ways that radically distinguished them from civilised folk. It was, in short, another 
structure marked by hyperseparated dualism, and one of the distinguishing criteria for making 
the  cut  between  ‘us’  and  ‘them’  was  animism.  According  to  Edward  Tylor,  a  foundational 
figure in the earlier use of the term, primitive people imagined that everything had within it a 
soul. As a secular thinker and materialist, Tylor argued that primitives failed to understand the 
absolute differences between humans and all others. According to Harvey, Tylor asserted that 
“animists  have  no  sense  of  the  ‘absolute  psychical  distinction  between  man  and  beast’  or 
between humanity and plants or even ‘objects.’”
12 His words indicate the pervasiveness of the 
binaries; he equates recognition of hyperseparated boundaries with civilisation, and thus he 
uses hyperseparation ideology to denigrate and dismiss Indigenous knowledge. 
The radical rethink of the term animism has been advanced by evidence arriving on 
three  major  fronts:  scientific,  philosophical  and  anthropological.  I  will  return  to  the 
anthropological front shortly, as it is an area where my own work has contributed, but I want 
briefly to mention science and philosophy. To the best of my knowledge, scientists have not 
sought  to  engage  in  an  argument  about  animism.  On  the  other  hand,  there  has  been 
outstanding research in the area of nonhuman sentience. Even where the research has had an 
anthropocentric bias, asking to what extent animal thinking and communicating is similar to 
that of humans, the results have been spectacular. Research that remains situated within an 
anthropocentric frame of inquiry does not radically destabilise the human/nonhuman binary. It 
extends the domain of sentience by using the human as the measure, and then finds that some 
others also conform to the human-based criteria. The approach is massively limited; indeed, as 
the  philosopher  Christian  Diehm  argues,  an  anthropocentric  approach  actually  disables  all 
manner of human experience and knowledge in relation to nonhumans.
13 
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Far more interesting is the research of ethologists who ask questions that are both more 
simple and more complex: do animals (for example) experience an emotional life? Do animals 
have a  s e n s e  o f  m o r a l i t y  a n d  j u s t i c e ?  D o  t h e y  e x p e r i e n c e  e m p a t h y ?  M a r c  B e k o f f  i s  a n  
outstanding  figure  in  this  area,  and  his  work  is  the  visible  tip  of  a  large  and  fascinating 
iceberg.
14 And yet, even when we consider life forms whose way of life is vastly different from 
humans, we find a growing sense of their intelligence and intentionality. Biochemist Daniel 
Koshland discusses the life of desire experienced by bacteria: 
 
‘Choice’, ‘discrimination’, ‘memory’, ‘learning’, ‘instinct’, ‘judgement’, and ‘adaptation’ are 
words we normally identify with higher neural processes. Yet, in a sense, a bacterium can 
be said to have each of these properties.
15 
 
None of this work tells us how we should engage with nonhumans once we accept that 
they are not mindless brutes or stimulus-response machines. It does tell us, however, that the 
hyperseparated dualism that would claim that there are no relevant continuities between the 
minds of humans and the minds of other living beings is not founded in evidence. To the 
contrary,  evidence  across  many  life  forms  including  plants,
16 is  increasingly  indicating  the 
widespread, possibly universal, existence of sentience and agency. 
Val  was  a  significant  thinker  in  philosophical  debates  about  ethical  relationships 
between humans and nonhumans not only for what she offered, but for how she side-stepped 
many approaches that may be defensible through logic but that do not lead us into ways of 
opening ourselves to an ethical involvement with our earth others. Her aim was to open ethics 
for action, not to offer further iterations of abstract analysis of the logic of ethics.  
Most of her argument was laid out extensively in Environmental Culture. Here she put 
forward an interspecies ethic of recognition which depended on a particular stance toward the 
nonhuman world. That is, she was not making a set of truth claims about the world, but rather 
was  asking  what  kind  of  stance  a  human  can  take  that  will  open  her  to  a  responsive 
engagement in relation to nonhuman others. Her answer was that to recognise “earth others as 
fellow agents and narrative subjects is crucial for all ethical, collaborative, communicative and 
mutualistic projects, as well as for place sensitivity.”
17 One  effect  of  opening  one’s  self,  as 
human, would be to dispel the myth of mindlessness, not through a logical account of mind, 
but  through  the  experience  of  being  one  amongst  many  in  a  world  already  replete  with 
mindfulness. In opening one’s self to others as communicative beings, one places one’s self in 
a position of being able to experience communication. She saw this as a step toward a post-
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Cartesian  reconstruction  of  mind.
18 It  would  recognise  intentionality,  and  it  would  include 
communication, exchange, and agency.
19  
One of the things that is so remarkable about Val’s approach to ethics is that it avoids 
all those abstract questions of who or what is morally considerable, and what may be meant by 
that. Rather than querying others, it asks the human to query herself, and it seeks to open the 
human to the experience of others in the contexts of their own communicative and expressive 
lives. Here, as elsewhere, she was concerned with paths (toward others) rather than answers 
(about others). An approach that starts with recognition of expression is a ‘gateway’ through 
which we can find ourselves encountering the force of the fact “that the larger-than-human 
world counts for something in its own terms as well as in terms of our relationship to it.”
20   
This  gateway  (or  ‘door’  as  she  described  it  in  her  definition  of  what  philosophical 
animism  does),  entails  interspecies  communication.
21  Here  again,  she  is  not  defining 
communication in strictly human terms; there is no suggestion that other creatures sit around 
debating  philosophy,  but  she  is  asserting  that  as  other  creatures  live  their  lives,  so t h e y  
communicate  aspects  of  themselves.  Amidst  all  this  communication,  one  finds  one’s  self 
encountering expressiveness and mindfulness within the world of life.
22 And amidst all this 
mindfulness, there arises a dialogical concept of self for both the human and for others.
23  
In sum, Plumwood’s philosophical animism “opens the door to a world in which we 
can begin to negotiate life membership of an ecological community of kindred beings.”
24 Her 
use of the term ‘kindred’ means beings with whom we are kin; she was claiming an earth 
kindred,  or  kinship  amongst  those  she  called  earth  others.  We  tend  to  think  of  kinfolk  as 
organic  beings,  but  Val  was  open  even  to  thinking  about  kinship  with  stones  and  other 
inorganic ‘beings.’
25 
 
Indigenous animism 
Anthropologists  have  been  vigorously  rethinking  animism,  and  are  offering  analysis  that 
engages  with  Indigenous  people’s  own  accounts  of  personhood  (rather  than,  like  Tylor, 
imposing an external framework of analysis upon them). This new animism finds its starting 
point in the work of the anthropologist Hallowell, whose 1960 account of Ojibwa personhood 
made  the  perspicacious  point  that  Ojibwa  concepts  of  personhood  did  not  start  with  the 
human and extend outward to the world, but rather started with a wide category of ‘persons,’ 
one  sub-group  of  which  were  humans.  In  Ojibwa  ontology,  there  are  numerous  kinds  of 
persons—stone persons, bear persons, and many more.
26 The basic points that Hallowell put 
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forward have since been found to be widespread amongst Indigenous people: that humans are 
one kind of person among many, that persons (of all types) are wilful, interactive, sociable and 
communicative, and that one of the aims of a human life is to learn over the course of a 
lifetime to understand and respect nonhuman persons and their ways of life.  
On-going  research  by  anthropologists,  philosophers  and  others  is  showing  that  to 
decentre  the  human  as  the  privileged  source  of  mindfulness  in  the  world  is  to  radically 
overturn  much  of  how  we  in  the  west  have  understood  the  world.
27 Harvey  points  to  Val 
Plumwood’s essay “Being Prey” in which she discusses her experience of being taken by a 
crocodile  (discussed  in  greater  detail  below)  as  a  key  text  for  vividly  illuminating  the 
understanding that nonhumans “have a point of view” and that it is not necessarily, or even 
likely, to be one that privileges humans.
28 To be a member of a wider community of persons, 
and to understand that fact, is a humbling experience, to say the least. And at the same time, it 
is  an  enriching  experience.  In  turning  toward  nonhumans  with  openness  toward  the 
unexpected (a necessary attitude given that they are not inert), the human person holds herself 
available and attentive to the worlds and multifarious ‘voices’ of others.  
One of the Australian Aboriginal people who taught me was an Elder named Steve 
Meredith, a Ngiyampaa man whose country is in western New South Wales. In his words: 
 
What happens is because the fellow went to school, for birds, they’re a bird expert, and 
then you get somebody went to school, they’re a plant expert. And the birds eat the plants, 
which is related to the soil which is related to the water which is related—that all interacts 
with the people, but they never seem to look at it that way. So that’s why we say they 
pigeonhole things. 
  
Whereas, the funny thing about it is, they pigeonhole all these things, and because they 
went to school [they think] they’re higher than all that, they’re above nature, and they tend 
to look down and study nature, like it’s ants on the ground. But when you fall asleep, eh, 
them ants they’ll crawl all over you. They’ll bite you, or sometimes they don’t, but them 
ants might be carrying out their research then, on you. But either way you look at it, you 
can’t be separate from it …
29  
 
This  ecologically  sparked-up  animist  thinking  works  with  a  logic  of  connection:  it  asserts 
relations of mutual inter-action, and tells us that humans are not only acting upon the world, 
but that others are also taking notice and acting upon humans.  
 
Creature communities 
I turn now to a more detailed discussion of Australian Indigenous animism. In 1980 I began my 
ethnographic research with Australian Aboriginal people in the Victoria River region of the 
Northern Territory of Australia, and that research is on-going. It led me from philosophical 
questions  about  the  meaning  of  life  and  death  to  a  study  of  ecological  knowledge,  for  it 
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became  clear  to  me  that  the  answers  to  many  of  the  questions  I  was  asking  are  located 
dialogically within the world of living beings.  
Communication and intelligence are integral to the flow of life in the world, using the 
term  intelligence  in  its  standard  everyday  meaning  of  “capacity  for  learning,  reasoning, 
understanding.”  Most  of  the  Elders  who  taught  me  have  used  another  term  that  is  more 
inclusive: they speak of culture, and they vigorously assert that culture is a specific way of 
being in the world. It follows that nonhuman beings have, and live by, culture. The evidence of 
life in action shows us that other beings have and follow their own ways. They have their own 
foods, foraging methods, forms of sociality and seasonality; they have their own languages and 
their  own  ceremonies.  According  to  one  Elder:  “birds  got  ceremony  of  their  own—brolga, 
turkey, crow, hawk, white and black cockatoo—all got ceremony, women’s side, men’s side, ... 
everything.” Plants as well as animals are sentient, and, according to many Aboriginal people, 
the earth itself has culture and power within it. In this line of thought, we are all culture-
creatures.  We  are  intelligent,  we a c t  w i t h  p u r p o s e ,  w e  c o m m u n i c a t e  a n d  t a k e  n o t i c e ,  w e  
participate in a world of multiple purposes. It is a multi-cultural world from inside the earth 
right on through.
30  
This generalisation is localised. Australian Aboriginal people have picked up the word 
‘country’ and remade it into a powerful signifier of local, multispecies belonging. In Indigenous 
country there is no nature/culture divide. One could say that country is all culture, but the 
more interesting point is that it is all sentient, communicative, relational and inter-active. In 
this sense, culture is not something you have, but rather is the way you live, and by implication, 
the way your knowledge arises and is worked with. Country is both the context of life and the 
emergent result of life being lived. Country exists because of the living beings who participate 
in the life of country, and country flourishes through looped and tangled relationships. Country 
has a past, a present and a future, it gives and receives life.
31 It is a matrix of communicative 
inter-action, a system of connectivities and benefits, a home on earth.  Furthermore, there is no 
actual outside of the system of countries: beyond this country is another one, beyond that 
another one. You can run, but you never get outside of country. This means that there is no 
outside place of knowledge, and no outside place where one is exempt from participation. All 
knowledge  is  “situated,”  to  use  the  feminist  term,
32 and  country  is  an  entangled  matrix  of 
multispecies situatedness.  
A  further  consequence  of  situated  knowledge  amongst  sentient  beings  is  that 
knowledge is relational. To live in a world of sentience is to be surrounded by others who are 
also  sentient.  I  will  consider  some  of  the  consequences  of  situated,  relational  knowledge 
through  a  conversation  I  had  with  another  Elder,  Snowy  Kulmilya,  a  terrific  hunter  and  a 
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fascinating  story-teller.  On  one  occasion  he  got  talking  about  how  to  hunt  echidnas 
(Tachyglossus aculeatus), also known as porcupine, or, in Ngarinman language, which was 
Snowy’s native tongue, junkuwuru. In the following passage I have changed his English slightly 
to bring it more in line with standard English, but I have kept his dialogical storytelling style.  
 
Snowy: When they want to go hunting porcupine, night time, they can't talk like that, can’t 
talk “I'm going hunting junkuwuru.”  They can't. You can't call him name, you can't find 
him then. When you go hunting night time, you can't findem porcupine. Porcupine might 
be gone bush somewhere. Inside the cave. 
 
Debbie: So what do you have to do? 
 
Snowy: You just gotta talk, oh I'm going walkabout kirinjin, they call him. Kirinjin. 
 
Debbie: Kirinjin? 
 
Snowy:  Kirinjin,  that's  that  name  now,  porcupine  hunting.  They  know.  And  they  talk 
‘kirinjin’.  You can't talk junkuwuru. You frighten him. That’s different, eh? They call out to 
each other: “what there old man?” “I go kirinjin, this one.”  We go at night, you know. Full 
night time, you know. 
 
Debbie: A bit tricky? 
 
Snowy: Tricky, yeah. Well porcupine he's tricky too, I think. Might be, I don't know. I don’t 
know how he does it. 
 
Snowy’s  story  tells  us  that  there  are  many  active  intelligences  out  there  paying  attention. 
Indeed, within a context of hunting, killing and eating, creature-culture intelligence can be 
highly charged. Here is Kathy Deveraux, an Aboriginal woman from the floodplains southwest 
of Darwin, telling about what it takes to be a great hunter: 
 
An exceptional good hunter-gatherer is known to have milityin powers. They are regarded 
highly for their hunting prowess in providing food for the camp. A milityin rarely comes 
back empty handed. ... the milityin may not only have to consider where a barramundi or 
long-neck turtle may be resting in the middle of a hot day, but must take extra precautions 
for the big crocodile who regularly cruises up and down his territory. A milityin has to out-
think and out-smart them all.
33 
 
The term milityin is not gender-specific. Kathy was an outstanding milityin, and she spoke from 
years  of  personal  experience  when  she  described  watching  out  for  the  big  crocodile  who 
cruises up and down his territory.  
Val  Plumwood  had  the  experience  of  actually  being  taken  by  a  crocodile.  While 
canoeing in Kakadu National Park during the season when crocodiles become territorial, she 
was attacked and taken  into  the  death  roll  three  times  before  escaping  up  the  river  bank. 
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Wounded and bleeding, she crawled for hours trying to reach the ranger station, and was 
finally  rescued  and  rushed  to  hospital.  This  experience  had  a  formative  impact  on  her 
understanding  of  being  a  creature  in  a  world  in  which  other  creatures  have  their  own 
intelligence and objectives:  
 
Some of the minds we encounter ... tell us things we need to know ... They include ... 
canny animals who gaze back, size you up and tell you who you are ... and where you get 
off. To stay alive and reproduce they have to—and to all but the most reduction-blinded 
observer patently do—think ahead, try to outsmart you, work out how to escape your reach, 
and fool you with successful attempts to distract your attention.
34 
 
Active Attention 
In western thought, the active voice is the speaking voice. Val targeted for critique our western 
arrogance in imagining that we are the only creatures who speak, and thus the only ones who 
possess the active voice.
35 Her argument pointed to another aspect of the nature/culture binary, 
one that has positioned humans as expressive agents (active) and to position nonhumans as 
those with nothing to express (passive). Her purpose was to open the idea of nature’s own 
expressive voice. One of the problems, of course, has been that of equating communication, or 
expression,  with  language.  Patrick  Curry,  reminds  us  that  the  problem  of  conflating 
communication with language throws us back into a human-centric enclosure. In his words: 
 
Nature  is  not  ‘mute’.  It  is  eloquent:  discursively  structured  and  therefore  meaningful 
throughout, saturated with messages and stories, and without any stuff (energy), so far as 
we shall ever know, that is unpatterned—all of which includes, but vastly exceeds, both us 
and our language, the latter itself a subset of our own discursivity. Meanings and values 
‘are not “outside” nature, but have always been integral to its constitution.’ And human 
participation is not an optional extra; it is entailed by being alive.
36 
 
As David Abram and others have shown, to the extent that we western people regard 
expression as the major form of active communication, we may be ill-prepared to consider 
listening as another, equally important, form of active engagement.
37 The backgrounding of 
listening (receiving information) is also part of the structure of hyperseparated dualisms: to 
speak is the human prerogative (because we have language), it is the active mode of being; 
listening (or being spoken to) is the passive or recipient position. The power relation is clearly 
hierarchical: those who speak are more powerful than those who are spoken to.  
I  am  proposing  that  listening,  and  more  broadly,  paying  attention,  should  also  be 
considered  an  active  verb;  indeed  in  multispecies  creature  communities,  it  must  be  so 
considered. To pay attention is to exercise intelligence, to know so as to be able to inter-act. 
‘Inter-action’ denotes action undertaken in a participatory field of actors all or many of whom 
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are  actively  paying  attention. I  a m  s p e c i f i c a l l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  m u l t i s p e c i e s ,  m u l t i -cultural 
zones of inter-action. We are in such zones all the time, of course: this is part of the meaning, 
the beauty, and the peril of being alive. But the mind/matter binary leads us to neglect, perhaps 
even deny, the knowledge that we humans, too, are being observed, are “part of the feast” as 
Val so vividly described it.
38  
Consider the crocodile: its silent and concealed attentiveness is very far from passive! 
Often it exercises its intelligence precisely by paying attention without drawing attention. Good 
hunters (nonhumans and humans) do this: they know others are paying attention, they know 
the ways in which others pay attention, and they find ways to circumvent that attention. The 
exercise of agency calls for both communication and attention; one is not so much an actor as 
an  inter-actor  or  participant.  Let  us  think  that  to  participate  is  to  be  attentive,  to  be 
knowledgeable,  to  act  on  knowledge,  or  to  refrain  from  acting  (which  is  also  a  form  of 
intelligence).  Snowy  was  explaining  all  this  in  relation  to  porcupines:  part  of  what  makes 
porcupines  intelligent  and  hard  to  hunt  is  that  they  are  actively  paying  attention,  actively 
knowing what is going on in their world, and inter-acting on the basis of that knowledge. 
Successful inter-action, for an echidna who is being hunted, is to elude the hunter. That too, 
that capacity to remain hidden, is a form of action. 
Another facet of communication is that the world is full of what the Elders who taught 
me  called  ‘tellers.’  Tellers  are  those  who  provide  information:  they  give  news  of  what  is 
happening in the world. A few examples will convey the sense of tellers: 
 
•  When the march flies bite, the crocodiles are laying their eggs.  
•  When the jangarla tree (Sesbania Formosa) flowers, the barramundi are biting.  
•  When the cicadas sing, the figs are ripe and the turtles are fat.  
•  A type of swift flies high in the air before the cold weather begins, but comes down 
to make its nest and stay at the lower altitudes during the cold weather.  
•  When the fireflies come, the conkerberries (Carissa lanceolata) are ripe. 
 
This communicative system depends on knowledge, and is highly localised. March flies, for 
example, start biting across a wide area, but the meaning of that bite varies from one locale to 
the next.
39 The system opens the human sensorium, extending it through attentiveness to others: 
jangarla trees tell what is going on under water where humans cannot stay for long; swifts tell 
what is happening in the upper atmosphere; march flies tell what is happening along the banks 
of  billabongs  and  rivers,  whether  people  are  there  or  not.  For  humans  and  others  to  gain 
knowledge from tellers, therefore, they must pay active attention.   
All  these  tellings  can  be  thought  of  as  languages.  Following  Peter  Boyle’s  inspired 
phrase, I am inclined to call them creature-languages: the multiple languages of the complex 
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living world.
40 Creature-languages draw the full sensorium into the communicative matrix of 
country. The sight and smell of flowers, the pain of the march fly bite and the sensation of 
blood running down the leg, the sight of swifts in the sky or flower petals drifting in the river, 
fireflies  winking  and  the  interminable  racket  of  cicadas:  these  are  multi-faceted  creature-
languages, and smart creatures take notice. Humans enhance their intelligence not by stepping 
out  of  the  system  and  trying  to  control  it,  but  by  enmeshing  themselves  ever  more 
knowledgeably into the creature-languages of country.  
A significant aspect of the knowledge system based in country and made up of many 
participants is that no one knows everything. Snowy Kulmilya expressed this in his discussion 
of hunting echidnas. His ‘I don’t know’ is fundamental to being a participant in country. To be 
on the inside is to know that one’s knowledge does not encompass all the others; to know that 
country exceeds the knowing of any given knower or any given type of knower.  In contrast to 
a human-centric understanding of knowledge that would see a lack of human knowledge as an 
epistemological gap waiting to be filled, in creature communities knowledge is widely and 
patchily distributed. There is a multiplicity of perspectives and knowledges, and there is no 
privileged  perspective.  Where  one  person’s  or  species’  knowledge s t o p s ,  s o m e o n e  e l s e ’ s  
knowledge picks up the story. 
 
Attention on the Inside 
One of the many interesting things about creature languages is that they do not always require 
an audience: march flies will do what they will do whether anyone is paying attention or not, 
and so will swifts and cicadas and many others. Their way of living is communicative, but it is 
not necessarily targeted at anyone in particular. This thought is helpful to westerners, I think, as 
many  of  us  may  find  ourselves  embarrassed  at  the t h o u g h t  t h a t  c o u n t r y  m i g h t  r e a l l y  b e  
addressing us in particular. For my part, I have from time to time encountered real discomfort 
around  the  idea  that  any  nonhuman  being  really  gives  a  darn  about  me  and  my  projects, 
outside  of  the  obvious  contexts  of,  say,  hunting—as  predator  and  as  prey.  However,  the 
corollary to the idea of nobody giving a darn would be that what I do doesn’t matter, and that 
is clearly not true. Certainly, we do not get off so lightly in Indigenous thought: while march 
flies may not be telling us to dig croc eggs, any more than they may be telling crocs to lay their 
eggs, those who understand the teller and act on the message, are putting themselves into the 
story. They are interacting with the patterns of country, and so they too become part of the 
patterns. And if there is information, and if the person does respond, then there is a patterned 
relationship  that  can  be,  and  often  is,  described  in  its  particularity  in  ways  that  can  be 
understood as targeted. To go back to an earlier story, ants probably do not care deeply about 
Deborah Rose, but I can assert that they have carried out inordinately intrusive research on me. 
I have my ant stories, and for a while there, when I was targeted for intense investigation, they 
were  clearly  communicating  something  amongst  themselves  concerning  the  apparently 
fascinating terrain of my swag and my flesh. The inter-action disturbed me, and seemed to 
stimulate them. We were certainly co-present in our conflicting desires, and the words with 
which I addressed them are best imagined rather than published.  
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One of my most interesting teachers was Old Jimmy Manngaiyarri. He lived well into 
his nineties, had walked through huge stretches of country, and had a magnificent memory. In 
one of our long conversations he tried to tell me about how the earth itself communicates. The 
conversation took place not long after we had made a trip to a place called Neave Gorge, 
south  of  Daguragu,  an  Aboriginal  community  along  the  Victoria  River  in  the  Northern 
Territory. During the course of the trip we had a couple of flat tires, and got into an area of 
washaways that were difficult and increasingly dangerous. Good judgement suggested that we 
turn  back.  In  a  subsequent  conversation  Jimmy  used  the  words  mind  and  memory 
interchangeably in his effort to get me to understand that our decision had a story: 
 
Jimmy: That’s what this earth makes you to do. Makes you go this way. Or you go up here. 
You get up first thing in the morning, when you camp you get up first thing in the morning, 
and you go. That’s the word earth give you—whatever way you go, see? 
 
Debbie: If earth is trying to tell you, do you hear that with your ear? 
 
Jimmy: You got to think! Well, this earth must be tell you: “Ah, go this way.” Well, you 
must be go that way. Well, you must be good. You go up that way. 
 
Debbie: How does it tell you? 
 
Jimmy: On your mind. Earth got to tell you all thing. Might be say: “Ah, you leave me. 
What for you go away? You go over there, you get hurt.” You got to go only what this earth 
tell you to. Where you going to go, you going to go right way. That’s the way you got to 
follow this earth. Tell you everything right way. Right way to go, see? 
 
Debbie: How? 
 
Jimmy: You and me went down to Neave Gorge. And come back straight away. That’s 
nobody been tell you and me to do that? This earth tell you! In your memory. Well that’s 
the way. You and me can’t miss. Do it properly, looking after ourselves. Do the right thing. 
This earth understand EVERYthing. Think on your memory now! You got that word from 
this earth.  
 
 “You  got  that  word,”  Old  Jimmy  tells  us,  but  this  language,  which  seems  to  give 
guidance as to how to be a good and safe person, remains elusive. Goodness involves being 
responsive to what earth says, but Old Jimmy brings me to a frustrating limit—not of ethics but 
of epistemology. How do we learn the attention that would enable us to admit earth ‘words’ 
into our lives? It seems that if communication is to occur, people have to learn to understand 
many,  many  other  creatures,  paying  attention,  for  example  to  the  multitude  of  creature-
languages—the  sounds,  smells,  and  behaviour,  the  flowering  trees,  the  seasons,  and  the 
comings and goings of birds, insects and other creatures, and the silences too. In Old Jimmy’s 
explanation, it seems one also has to be attentive to one’s own experience, to regard the living 
of life itself as always communicative. Life on the inside of country includes one’s self, and 
thus one’s own experience is communicative, too. The work of a lifetime is a never-completed 
project  of  participatory  goodness,  in  which  goodness  means  paying a t t e n t i o n  a n d  a c t i n g  
properly.  / Environmental Humanities 3 (2013) 
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Gratitude  
Val spoke and wrote about a materialist spirituality, a core feature of which was gratitude. Her 
spirituality emerges from recognition of the elements and beings that support and nourish our 
lives, and is articulated through the mutual life giving between humans and the nonhuman 
world. Mutual life giving is the basis of ecological emplacement. She was mindful of the words 
of Native Americans who keep honour and respect in the heart of spirituality.
41 She found 
courage and wisdom in Australian Aboriginal concepts of belonging, and drew on the words of 
Big Bill Neidjie (1989) of Arnhem Land (Northern Territory) in an article published just a month 
or so after she died.
42  
He said: “You got to hang onto this story because the earth, this ground, earth where 
you brought up, this earth he grow you,” and he repeats the point elsewhere: “This piece of 
ground he grow you.”
43 Val remarks that “this piece of ground that grows you (in the same 
way … as it grows a plant or a tree)” reflects a view in which country is “an active agent in and 
co-constituter of our lives,” along with the view that growing something or someone up is “a 
process in which the energy of others is actively invested.”
44 
Her understanding of the material world as a mindful place made up of interactions 
amongst many mindful beings seemed to pose a communicative challenge for her, and was 
directly  related  to  her  conviction  that  “the  real  meaning  of  ecological  literacy”  is  the 
development  of  “stories  that  create  much  greater  transparency  of  these  [inter-active] 
relationships in our day-to-day lives.” She was arguing that we of the west must once again 
become “a culture of stories—stories that link our lives with the Great Life which some call 
Gaia,  but  all  should  call  by  names  of  their  own  devising.”
45 She  ended  up  calling  for 
philosophy to “converge with much of poetry and literature” because poetry and literature 
have better methods for “making room” for understanding the vivid presence of mindful life on 
earth.
46 The quest for poetic forms of writing articulates her understanding that inside a world 
of dynamic inter-action, knowledge arises through participation; to “make room” for others, 
one needs to do more than represent. Somehow, one needs to vivify, to leap across imaginative 
realms, to connect, to empathise, to be addressed and to be brought into gratitude.  
Poetry may be particularly suited to communicating experiences from ‘inside’ the world 
of country. Peter Boyle, for example, makes a contrast between reporting languages and poetry. 
Poetry, he says, “reports no information, delivers no instructions.” It moves on a plane that has 
no space for the manipulation of others—“there is no room for lying.” Primarily, he writes, 
poetry (and music) “do not tell us about things—they place us inside them.” Poetry thus calls 
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forth an attentiveness through which it is “capable not merely of mirroring our perceptions of 
the world—as everyday language does—but of delivering new perceptions, new realities.”
47     
In pursuit of an expanded communicative repertoire, Val was writing stories as well as 
philosophy.  Her  “Journey  to  the  Heart  of  Stone,”  for  example,  starts  with  the  claim  that 
“creative  writing  can  also  play  an  important  part  by  making  visible  new  possibilities  for 
radically  open  and  non-reductive  ways  to  experience  the  world.”
48  She  was  able  to 
communicate radically open ways of experiencing the world because she herself had had such 
experiences. She once told us a story about something she encountered when walking along 
the edge of a wooded area and hearing some birds singing sweetly. When she glanced up she 
saw that they were crows. The instant they saw her noticing them, their voices changed into 
the familiar raspy crow register. Peter Boyle wrote a prose poem about this event:  
 
Crow: 
The sound of crows is known to us for its mournfulness, its insistent black edge to a bright 
world. There was a day when she stepped into a clearing and surprised crows at their other 
speech, the cheerful joyous rapture they know from time to time when no one is about, 
when they are completely free of all other creatures’ expectations. It did not last long, less 
than a minute before the crows perceived her startled presence. In that minute how taken 
home she felt to the world’s deep joy. 
 
Coda: 
Or perhaps as a girl what had happened was this: for one moment she became a crow and 
heard crows the way crows hear themselves. Nothing has changed in the singing of the 
crows, the same pitches and frequencies spliced against a clearing in sunlight. Only for this 
one time her ears, her entire being perceived these sounds according to the delicate inner 
coding of a crow. Just like the small brown and grey birds, so drab to our eyes, that to each 
other are splashes of the brightest iridescent colour, so, through a strange grace, she had 
perceived  that  day  for  those  few  moments  as  a  crow  does,  had  grasped  their  smooth 
eloquent harmonies gliding between the interrupted stuttering of the trees.
49 
 
Earth  language  is  never  monological;  always  relational,  it  is  a  call  to  enter  into 
encounters,  to  be  co-present  and  engaged.  We  know  that  nonhumans  communicate  in 
multiple registers, and perhaps it is necessary, therefore, to be able to listen in multiple registers. 
Surely there must be on-going inter-action, and surely the stories we tell must be woven with 
the  stories  we  acknowledge  others  to  be  telling?  Living  things,  including  humans,  are 
expressive, and if we take Old Jimmy at his word even if we do not fully understand it, the 
earth speaks too. Like the butterfly that came and rested in Val’s coffin, the communicative life 
of earth keeps us in its ken. 
Perhaps it seems like magic, this butterfly, or perhaps like some amazing coincidence, 
but it is neither. In a sentient world, the world speaks.  
Its great story is that it speaks, and our great story is that we are part of its speaking.  
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